Introduction
The dynamics of cross-Strait relations present an extremely interesting case for the study of soft power. In terms of the distribution of hard power-that is, coercive force and economic strength-Taiwan has suffered from an increasingly unfavorable asymmetric relationship with mainland China (the People's Republic of China, or PRC), with China enjoying an overwhelming advantage that only grows stronger with each passing day. But just as China's hard power to cajole Taiwan to move in its favored direction by coercion and economic inducement has risen rapidly over the last two decades, Beijing's policy toward Taiwan has paradoxically become more accommodating.
Beijing has increasingly learned to live with Taiwan's democracy. It has become the received view among PRC's policy elite that if the PRC wants to inf luence Taipei's policy, it had better start by changing opinions and winning hearts on the island. To achieve this, Beijing has to hand out "carrots" and hide its "sticks." The "carrots" range from buying agricultural produce from Taiwan's farmers, offering Taiwanese compatriots "national treatment" when living in the mainland, allowing mainland Chinese tourists to visit Taiwan, and extending low-interest loans to Taiwanese firms operating in mainland China.
In PRC president Hu Jintao's latest peace overture to Taiwan, he reached out to the Taiwanese people by offering reassurance that their wishes for autonomy and self-governance should be respected, while at the same time reiterating Beijing's mantra of opposing Taiwan's independence and protecting the sovereign integrity of China. Most noticeably, Hu has replaced "peaceful unification" with "peace and development" as the new guiding principle for conducting cross-Strait relations.
2 This marked shift in Beijing's policy toward Taiwan is utterly inexplicable within the framework of a traditional realist paradigm. Under this framework, a small player can best ward off the threat of its stronger rival with a right mixture of balance of power and limited military deterrence, but it has no way to move the other side to the rival's favored position. For a full understanding of why mutual adjustment and accommodation in strategic priorities and approaches is possible in cross-Strait relations, one has to take into account Taiwan's exercise of soft power over mainland China.
This chapter aims for a systematic understanding of how Taiwan can use its soft power not only to steer the course of cross-Strait relations but also to shape mainland China's political future. This exercise fills up an important void in the study of soft power in East Asia. It also enriches our understanding of the use of soft power under an unfavorable asymmetric strategic relationship.
Three tasks are accomplished in this chapter. First, the specific elements and mechanisms that constitute Taiwan's soft power are identified and its application is contextualized in the cross-Strait setting. It is argued that Taiwan's soft power comes from many sources, the most important being the demonstration effect of Taiwan's democratic experience, the inherited strong cultural and linguistic affinity between Taiwan and the mainland, Taiwan's vibrant and diversified civil society, and strong economic and social ties. It is also argued that the exercise of soft power has little to do with public diplomacy, the most familiar form of state-organized soft power. The principal agents of change are instead Taiwan's numerous private actors acting on their own initiatives.
Second, some empirical evidence is examined by utilizing a special survey that was administered among urban residents in mainland China in 2006. The survey asked an extensive set of questions about mainland Chinese urban residents' perceptions of Taiwan, and their encounters with people from Taiwan and Taiwan-related information. The data confirm a widely held belief that the geographical proximity
